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A modal logic amalgam of classical and
intuitionistic logic
Steffen Lewitzka∗
Abstract
A famous result, conjectured by Go¨del in 1932 and proved by McKinsey
and Tarski in 1948, says that ϕ is a theorem of intuitionistic propositional
logic IPC iff its Go¨del-translation ϕ′ is a theorem of modal logic S4. In this
paper, we extend an intuitionistic version of modal logic S1+SP, introduced
in our previous paper [14], to a classical modal logic L and prove the fol-
lowing: a propositional formula ϕ is a theorem of IPC iff ϕ is a theorem
of L (actually, we show: Φ ⊢IPC ϕ iff Φ ⊢L ϕ, for propositional Φ, ϕ).
Thus, the map ϕ 7→ ϕ is an embedding of IPC into L, i.e. L contains a
copy of IPC. Moreover, L is a conservative extension of classical proposi-
tional logic CPC. In this sense, L is an amalgam of CPC and IPC. We show
that L is sound and complete w.r.t. a class of special Heyting algebras with
a (non-normal) modal operator.
1 Introduction
According to the informal Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics (BHK) of in-
tuitionistic propositional logic (IPC), intuitionistic truth is provability: a formula
is true if there is a proof for it. Logical connectives then have a constructive mean-
ing. For instance, a proof of ϕ ∨ ψ is given by a proof of ϕ or by a proof of ψ. In
an attempt to formalize BHK, Go¨del [11] interprets IPC in a modal extension of
classical propositional logic (namely Lewis system S4) by defining a translation
ϕ 7→ ϕ′ that maps any propositional formula ϕ to a modal formula ϕ′ such that
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the following holds: if ϕ is a theorem of IPC, then ϕ′ is a theorem of S4. Go¨del
also conjectured the converse, i.e.
(1.1) ⊢IPC ϕ ⇔ ⊢S4 ϕ′
for any propositional ϕ. This conjecture was later proved by McKinsey and Tarski
[16].1 Thus, Brouwer’s intuitionistic logic, as axiomatized by Heyting, can be
recovered from modal system S4 by the equivalence (1.1) above. However, since
the Go¨del translation ϕ 7→ ϕ′ is not trivial, S4 contains IPC only in indirect,
codified form. In particular, the modal operator of system S=S4 cannot be seen as
a predicate for intuitionistic truth in the following sense:
(1.2) ϕ is true in S iff ϕ belongs to a given prime theory of IPC
for any propositional ϕ.2
In this paper, we present a modal logic L such that (1.2) above holds with S=L.
Soundness of L then implies the right-to-left direction of the following equiva-
lence (1.3). The left-to-right direction can easily be shown by an induction on the
length of a derivation. For any propositional ϕ:
(1.3) ⊢IPC ϕ ⇔ ⊢L ϕ
Actually, we will show the following stronger result:
(1.4) Φ ⊢IPC ϕ ⇔ Φ ⊢L ϕ,
for any set of propositional formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ}. Thus, derivations in IPC are mir-
rored by corresponding derivations in L by means of the modal operator. In par-
ticular, the mapping ϕ 7→ ϕ defines an embedding of IPC into L. That is, L
contains a copy of IPC and behaves in a similar way as a conservative extension.
Moreover, L is a conservative extension of classical propositional logic CPC. In
this sense, L can be viewed as an amalgam or a combination of IPC and CPC. In
the combined logic L, IPC is separated from CPC by means of the modal opera-
tor, which avoids the collapsing of both logics. Combinations of logics in a much
more general context have been studied extensively over the last years (see [4]
1For much more details and historical background, we refer the reader to [17, 1].
2Of course, truth is a semantic notion which is defined relative to a given model. Recall that
the set of formulas true at a given possible world of a Kripke model of intuitionistic logic forms
a prime theory, and each prime theory corresponds to a world of a Kripke model. Hence, in
intuitionistic logic, “ϕ is true” means that ϕ belongs to a given prime theory of IPC.
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for an excellent overview). Known combining techniques largely rely on the con-
cept of fibring originally introduced by Gabbay (see [8, 9, 10]). These techniques
generally assume that the object logics are defined over different languages. The
so-called collapsing problem was first identified in [8, 9] for the special case of
combining intuitionistic and classical propositional logic: in the semantics of the
combined logic, the logical connectives of the composed language have classi-
cal behaviour. That is, the combination results in a collapsing of intuitionistic
logic into classical logic. A logical system that combines classical and intuition-
istic logic avoiding the problem is found in [6]. A first general solution to the
collapsing problem, based on modulated fibring, is presented in [5]. In [3], the
authors propose cryptofibring semantics as a generalization of fibring semantics
and show that this provides a solution to the collapsing problem. Other solutions
to the problem are given by graph-theoretic fibring [18, 19] and, more recently,
by a new method called meet combination of logics [20, 21].
The present paper is not in the tradition of fibring or related techniques of com-
bining logics, neither it pretends to compete with the sophisticated techniques de-
veloped in that research line. In fact, our approach relies on different assumptions
and motivations, which makes a direct comparison to complex fibring techniques
a difficult task. One of the main differences is the fact that our object logics IPC
and CPC are given in exactly the same propositional language. In the combined
system, the object logics then are distinguished by a modal operator. Semanti-
cally, the intuitionistic part of the amalgam is, roughly speaking, given by spe-
cial Heyting algebras whereas the classical part is given by ultrafilters contained
in those Heyting algebras. This represents a very compact semantical solution
which, together with the mentioned syntactical simplifications, ensures that, in
our view, the approach is technically simpler and less complex than known fib-
ring techniques. We believe that the proposed solution can be adapted to similar
cases of combining logics. To what extent this can be done and which are the
limitations in comparison to fibring techniques remains to be further investigated.
We would like to point out that the original motivation for the present approach
was not to develop new combining techniques but rather to find a classical modal
logic L with the properties (1.2) – (1.4) above. Of course, it would be nice to
have a minimal logic with those properties. Lewis modal system S1 turns out to
be a promising base. In our previous paper [14], we found an algebraic semantics
for the slightly stronger system S1+SP. The semantics essentially relies on prin-
ciples of non-Fregean logic [2] paired with the idea to identify strict equivalence
(ϕ ↔ ψ) with propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ. That is, we define an identity
connective by ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ↔ ψ). If a denotational semantics is available, then
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an identity connective should fulfill the following condition: ϕ ≡ ψ is satisfied
in a model iff ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition, i.e. the same element of the
underlying model-theoretic universe. In this paper, we show that it is enough to
extend an intuitionistic version of S1+SP by an axiom scheme that represents a
certain disjunction property and a scheme of theorems that represents the classi-
cal principle of tertium non datur in order to obtain a logic L with the desired
properties.
2 Modal logic L
The set Fm of formulas is inductively defined in the usual way over an infinite set
V = {x0, x1, x2, ...} of propositional variables, logical connectives ⊥,→,∨,∧,
and the modal operator . If x is a variable and ϕ, ψ are formulas, then we write
ϕ[x := ψ] for the formula that results from substituting ψ for x in ϕ. By Fm0 we
denote the set of (non-modal) propositional formulas, i.e. formulas without modal
operator . We use the following abbreviations:
• ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
• ¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥
• ⊤ := ¬⊥
• ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ) (strict equivalence)
• Φ := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}, for any set Φ ⊆ Fm.
In particular, we define an identity connective by strict equivalence.
In current logics, the meaning (denotation, Bedeutung) of a formula remains
unchanged if we replace a subformula by a formula with the same meaning. Ac-
tually, this property represents a general ontological law sometimes called in the
literature the Indiscernibility of Identicals. In a propositional language with (de-
finable) connectives for identity and implication, that law can be expressed by the
following Substitution Principle SP:
(ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ])
If propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ is given by strict equivalence, then most of
current modal logics (including non-normal modal logic S3, see [14]) satisfy SP.
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An exception is Lewis modal system S1, where that law is fulfilled in a weaker
form, namely as the rule of Substitution of Proved Strict Equivalents (SPSE): “If
ϕ ≡ ψ is a theorem, then any formula of the form χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ] is
a theorem”. There is no known intuitive semantics for S1, and the main reason
for that fact seems to be the weakness of rule SPSE. Indeed, in [14] we define a
natural algebraic semantics for modal system S1+SP, i.e the logic that results from
S1 by replacing rule SPSE with the stronger scheme of theorems SP.
The axioms are given by the following schemes (i)–(iv):
(i) intuitionistic propositional tautologies and their substitution-instances3
(ii) ϕ→ ϕ
(iii) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ))
(iv) (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ϕ ∨ψ) (disjunction property)
The inference rules are:
• Modus Ponens MP: “From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ.”
• Axiom Necessitation AN: “If ϕ is an axiom of scheme (i)–(iv), then infer
ϕ.”
Logic L is given by the above system of axiomes and rules plus theorems of
the form ϕ∨¬ϕ and SP. We write Φ ⊢L ϕ or shorter Φ ⊢ ϕ if there is a derivation
of ϕ from Φ in logic L. (Rule AN applies only to axioms but not to theorems.)
Let (i)’ be as (i) above, but with all classical tautologies instead of only intuition-
istic ones. Then logic S1+SP, as introduced in [14], is given by the system of
axioms (i)’,(ii) and (iii), rules MP and AN, and all formulas of the form SP as
theorems.
Note that because of scheme (iv), L is contained in no Lewis modal system. In
fact, it might be hard to find any natural Kripke-style semantics where (iv) would
be valid.
The Deduction Theorem can be proved in the usual way by induction on the
length of a derivation. Also the following results will be useful. Their proofs can
be found in [14] (Lemma 2.3 and Lemma 2.4, respectively).
3By a substitution-instance of a formula ϕ ∈ Fm0, we mean a formula which results from ϕ
by replacing some of its variables by formulas.
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Lemma 2.1 [14] For all formulas ϕ, ψ:
• ⊢ ϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤)
• ⊢ (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
The first item of Lemma 2.1 says that there is exactly one necessary proposi-
tion, namely the proposition denoted by ⊤. The second item is the well-known
modal law K. A further usefull fact is
Lemma 2.2 Let ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm. Then: ⊢ (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧ψ).
Proof. (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ϕ and (ϕ ∧ ψ) → ψ are (substitution-instances of) in-
tuitionistic theorems. Rule AN together with modal law K and rule MP yield
⊢ (ϕ∧ψ)→ ϕ and ⊢ (ϕ∧ψ)→ ψ. By propositional logic, ⊢ (ϕ∧ψ)→
(ϕ ∧ ψ). On the other hand, ϕ → (ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)) is an intuitionistic theo-
rem. Again, rule AN and principle K yield ⊢ ϕ → (ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)). By
transitivity of implication and principle K, ⊢ ϕ → (ψ → (ϕ ∧ ψ)). Thus,
⊢ (ϕ ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ). Now, the assertion follows. Q.E.D.
By Lemma 2.2, strict equivalence modulo L can be written by (ϕ ↔ ψ)
instead of (ϕ→ ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ).
For propositional formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm0, we write Φ ⊢IPC ϕ if there is a
derivation of ϕ from Φ in intuitionistic propositional logic. Now, we are already
able to show the easy part of our Main Theorem:
Lemma 2.3 Let Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm0. Then Φ ⊢IPC ϕ implies Φ ⊢ ϕ.
Proof. Suppose Φ ⊢IPC ϕ. We show the assertion by induction on a derivation.
If ϕ is an intuitionistic axiom, then we apply rule AN to obtain ϕ. If ϕ ∈ Φ, then
obviously ϕ ∈ Φ. Finally, suppose ϕ is obtained in intuitionistic propositional
logic by Modus Ponens from ψ and ψ → ϕ. By induction hypothesis, Φ ⊢ ψ
and Φ ⊢ (ψ → ϕ). Then modal law K and rule MP yield Φ ⊢ ϕ. Q.E.D.
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3 Semantics
Recall that a Heyting algebra is a bounded lattice H = (H, f⊤, f⊥, f∨, f∧) with
an additional binary operation f→ which maps any two elements m,m′ ∈ H to
the greatest element f→(m,m′) = m′′ ∈ H with the property f∧(m,m′′) ≤ m′,
where ≤ is the lattice ordering. Given such an operation for implication, an op-
eration f¬ for complement is defined as follows: f¬(m) = f→(m, f⊥), for any
m ∈ H . A Heyting algebra is a Boolean algebra if f→(m,m′) = f∨(f¬(m), m′)),
for all elements m,m′. On the other hand, every Boolean algebra gives rise to a
Heyting algebra if one defines an implication operation in that way. A filter of a
Heyting algebra H is a non-empty subset F ⊆ H such that for all m,m′ ∈ H the
following hold:
(a) m ∈ F and m ≤ m′ implies m′ ∈ F ,
(b) m ∈ F and m′ ∈ F implies f∧(m,m′) ∈ F ,
(c) f⊥ /∈ F .
A filter F is prime if for all m,m′ ∈ H the following condition is fulfilled:
(d) f∨(m,m′) ∈ F implies m ∈ F or m′ ∈ F .
Finally, an ultrafilter is a filter which is maximal with respect to inclusion. A filter
F is an ultrafilter iff it has the following property: m /∈ F iff f¬(m) ∈ F , for all
m ∈ H . Every ultrafilter is prime. If the underlying Heyting algebra is a Boolean
algebra, then it also holds the converse: every prime filter is an ultrafilter. The
intersection of a non-empty set of filters is a filter. The smallest filter is the set
{f⊤}. It follows from Zorn’s Lemma that every filter extends to an ultrafilter.
Notice that the smallest filter {f⊤} of a Heyting algebra is not necessarily
prime. For instance, in any Boolean algebra we have f∨(m, f¬(m)) = f⊤, for
any element m. If this is not the two-element algebra, then we do not necessarily
have m = f⊤ or f¬(m) = f⊤ (consider a powerset algebra). On the other hand,
the Lo¨wenheim-Tarski algebra of intuitionistic propositional logic is an example
of a Heyting algebra with the disjunction property (in fact, it is well-known that
the smallest theory of intuitionistic logic, i.e. the set of intuitionistic theorems, is
a prime theory; see, e.g., [7]).
Definition 3.1 Let H be an Heyting algebra with top element f⊤. We say that H
has the disjunction property if the smallest filter {f⊤} is prime.
In a Heyting algebra with the disjunction property, it holds the following prop-
erty for all elementsm,m′: f∨(m,m′) = f⊤ ⇔ m = f⊤ orm′ = f⊤. There is, up
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to isomorphism, only one non-trivial Boolean algebra with the disjunction prop-
erty:
Lemma 3.2 Let B be a Boolean algebra. Then B has the disjunction property iff
B has at most two elements.
Proof. It is clear that any Boolean algebra with no more than two elements
has the disjunction property. Suppose a Boolean algebra B has the disjunction
property. Then for all its elements m: f∨(m, f¬(m)) = f⊤. Thus, m = f⊤ or
f¬(m) = f⊤, for all elements m. In a Boolean algebra, the latter equation is
equivalent with m = f⊥. That is, any element of B is either the greatest element
or it is the smallest element. Q.E.D.
Definition 3.3 A model M = (M,TRUE , f⊤, f⊥, f→, f∨, f∧, f) is a Heyting
algebra with an ultrafilter TRUE ⊆M and an additional operation f such that
for all m,m′, m′′ ∈ M and the induced lattice ordering ≤ the following truth
conditions hold:
(i) f(m) ≤ m
(ii) f(f→(m,m′)) ≤ f→(f(f→(m′, m′′)), f(f→(m,m′′)))
(iii) f(f∨(m,m′)) ≤ f∨(f(m), f(m′))
(iv) f(m) ∈ TRUE ⇔ m = f⊤
The elements of M are called propositions, TRUE is the set of true proposi-
tions, and f⊤ is the necessary (or the proved) proposition. An assignment on a
model M is a function γ : V → M which extends in the canonical way to a
function γ : Fm → M , i.e. γ(⊥) = f⊥, γ(ϕ) = f(γ(ϕ)) and γ(ϕ ∗ ψ) =
f∗(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)), where ∗ ∈ {→,∨,∧}.
Lemma 3.4 Every model has the disjunction property.
Proof. By conditions (iv) and (iii) of a model and the fact that TRUE is a prime
filter, we may argue in the following way: f∨(m,m′) = f⊤ ⇒ f(f∨(m,m′)) ∈
TRUE ⇒ f∨(f(m), f(m
′)) ∈ TRUE ⇒ f(m) ∈ TRUE or f(m
′) ∈
TRUE ⇒m = f⊤ or m
′ = f⊤. Q.E.D.
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Definition 3.5 An interpretation is a tuple (M, γ) consisting of a model M and
an assignment γ : V →M . The relation of satisfaction (truth) is given by
(M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE.
This notion extends in the usual way to sets of formulas. For a set of formulas Φ,
we define Mod(Φ) := {(M, γ) | (M, γ)  Φ}. This gives rise to the following
relation of logical consequence:
Φ  ϕ :⇔Mod(Φ) ⊆Mod({ϕ}).
Recall that in any Heyting algebra: m ≤ m′ ⇔ f→(m′, m) = f⊤, for all
elements m,m′. We will tacitly make use of this fact. The next result follows
readily from the definitions. It says that the defined connective ≡ has actually the
intended meaning of an identity connective.
Theorem 3.6 (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ).
Corollary 3.7 (Substitution Principle) For all ϕ, ψ, ψ′ ∈ Fm:
 (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ]).
Proof. Let (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ. That is, γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ). By induction on χ, one
shows that γ(χ[x := ϕ]) = γ(χ[x := ψ]). That is, (M, γ)  χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x :=
ψ]. Q.E.D.
We say that a formula ϕ is valid if ϕ denotes a true proposition in every Heyt-
ing algebra under every assignment. It is well-known that any intuitonistic tau-
tology denotes the top element in any Heyting algebra under any assignment. By
Corollary 3.7, the same holds true for any substitution-instance of an intuitionistic
tautology. Moreover, by the truth conditions of a model, all axioms of the form
(ii)–(iv) denote the top element. Thus, all axioms are valid, and rule AN is sound.
By Corollary 3.7, scheme SP is valid. Since TRUE is an ultrafilter, also all for-
mulas of the form ϕ∨¬ϕ are valid (although such a formula does not necessarily
denote the top element of a given Heyting algebra). Finally, suppose we are given
a Heyting algebra such that m ∈ TRUE and f→(m,m′) ∈ TRUE . Since TRUE
is a filter, we have f∧(m, f→(m,m′)) ∈ TRUE . If ≤ is the lattice ordering, then
f∧(m, f→(m,m
′)) ≤ m′, as in any Heyting algebra. Thus, m′ ∈ TRUE . This
shows that the rule of Modus Ponens is sound. Soundness of the calculus now
follows by induction on the length of a derivation.
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Theorem 3.8 (Soundness) For any set Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm, Φ ⊢ ϕ implies Φ  ϕ.
Corollary 3.9 Logic L is a conservative extension of classical propositional logic.
That is, for any ϕ ∈ Fm0, ϕ is a theorem of CPC iff ϕ is a theorem of L.
Proof. By definition of L as a deductive system, it contains all classical propo-
sitional tautologies as theorems. Thus, L extends CPC. Now let ϕ be a proposi-
tional formula with ⊢ ϕ. By soundness, ϕ is valid in L. In particular, ϕ denotes
the unique true proposition (the top element) of the two-element Boolean algebra,
under any assignment. This means that ϕ evaluates to true under any boolean, i.e.
bivalent, truth-value assignment. Thus, ϕ is valid in CPC. Q.E.D.
4 Completeness
The notions of a consistent, maximally consistent, inconsistent set of formulas
w.r.t. the deductive system L are defined in the usual way. A theory is a set of
formulas which is consistent and deductively closed. For a maximal theory Φ, i.e.
a maximally consistent set of formulas Φ, we define
ϕ ≈Φ ψ :⇔ Φ ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ.
Since L extends CPC and is itself a classical logic, a maximal theory Φ has
the well-known properties of a maximally consistent set such as ϕ ∈ Φ iff Φ ⊢ ϕ,
Φ ⊢ ϕ or Φ ⊢ ¬ϕ, for any ϕ, etc. In particular, Φ is a prime theory.
Lemma 4.1 Let Φ be a maximal theory. Then ≈Φ is an equivalence relation on
Fm with the following properties:
• If ϕ1 ≈Φ ψ1 and ϕ2 ≈Φ ψ2, then ϕ1 ≈Φ ψ1 and (ϕ1 ∗ϕ2) ≈Φ (ψ1 ∗ψ2),
where ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}.
• If ϕ ≈Φ ψ, then ϕ ∈ Φ⇔ ψ ∈ Φ.
• If ϕ ≈Φ ψ, then ϕ ∈ Φ⇔ ψ ∈ Φ.
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Proof. It follows from axioms of (intuitionistic) propositional logic and rule AN
that ≈Φ is reflexive and symmetric. Transitivity follows from applications of ax-
iom (iii). Thus, ≈Φ is an equivalence relation on Fm. Now suppose ϕ1 ≈Φ ψ1
and ϕ2 ≈Φ ψ2. Let x 6= y be variables such that x does not occur in ψ2 and y
does not occur in ϕ1. Then by SP and rule MP: (ϕ1 ∗ ϕ2) = (ϕ1 ∗ y)[y := ϕ2] ≈Φ
(ϕ1∗y)[y := ψ2] = (ϕ1∗ψ2) = (x∗ψ2)[x := ϕ1] ≈Φ (x∗ψ2)[x := ψ1] = (ψ1∗ψ2).
By transitivity of ≈Φ, we get (ϕ1 ∗ ϕ2) ≈Φ (ψ1 ∗ ψ2). Similarly, one shows
ϕ1 ≈Φ ψ1. The second item of the Lemma follows from axiom (ii) and MP.
The third item follows from the previous items of the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4.2 Every consistent set is satisfiable.
Proof. By Zorn’s Lemma (or even by weaker assumptions), a consistent set Ψ
extends to a maximal theory Φ. For ϕ ∈ Fm, let ϕ be the equivalence class of ϕ
modulo≈Φ. We define a modelM with the following ingredients:
• M := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fm}
• TRUE := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}
• functions f⊤, f⊥, f, f∗, where ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}, defined by f⊤ := ⊤, f⊥ :=
⊥, f(ϕ) := ϕ, f∗(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ ∗ ψ, respectively.
By Lemma 4.1, all these ingredients are well-defined. We show that M has
the properties of a model established in Definition 3.3. A Heyting algebra can be
characterized as a bounded lattice with an operation f→ such that certain equa-
tions are satisfied such as f→(m,m) = f⊤, etc. All these equations are in-
terpretations of intuitionistic theorems which are of the form of biconditionals
such as (ϕ → ϕ) ↔ ⊤, etc. Since Φ is a theory, it contains all intuitionistic
theorems, particularly those of the form ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2. By rule AN, Φ then con-
tains (ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2). Hence, ϕ1 = ϕ2. This shows that M satisfies all equa-
tional axioms which characterize the class of Heyting algebras. Recall that the
underlying lattice ordering ≤ can be recovered by the equivalence ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔
ϕ→ ψ = f⊤. Now one easily checks that TRUE is an ultrafilter on M. By
Lemma 2.1, ϕ ∈ Φ ⇔ ϕ ≡ ⊤ ∈ Φ. Thus, f(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ = f⊤. That
is, truth condition (iv) of a model (see Definition 3.3) is satisfied. Φ contains, in
particular, the axioms (ii)–(iv). By applying rule AN one shows that also the truth
conditions (i)–(iii) of a model are satisfied. Thus, M is a model in the sense of
Definition 3.3. We consider the assignment γ : V → M defined by x 7→ x. Then
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by induction on formulas one easily shows that γ(ϕ) = ϕ, for any formula ϕ.
Thus: ϕ ∈ Φ⇔ ϕ ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ (M, γ)  ϕ. Q.E.D.
In the same way as in CPC, Φ 0 ϕ implies that the set Φ∪{¬ϕ} is consistent.
The Completeness Theorem then follows from Lemma 4.2.
Corollary 4.3 (Completeness Theorem) Let Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm. Then Φ  ϕ
implies Φ ⊢ ϕ.
5 Main Theorem and Conclusions
Go¨del’s result [11] which says that ⊢IPC ϕ implies ⊢S4 ϕ′, where the map ϕ 7→ ϕ′
is Go¨del’s translation, can be shown by induction on derivations in IPC. Go¨del’s
conjecture that also the converse is true is harder to prove and was first established
years later by McKinsey and Tarski [16]. Fortunately, things are somewhat less
complicated in the case of our embedding of IPC into logic L which is managed
by the simpler map ϕ 7→ ϕ. The proof that Φ ⊢IPC ϕ implies Φ ⊢L ϕ relies on
a straightforward induction on derivations in IPC, see Lemma 2.3. In this section,
we will show that for propositional Φ, ϕ the converse holds, too.
Theorem 5.1 Let Φ ∪ {χ} ⊆ Fm0. Then Φ ⊢L χ⇔ Φ ⊢IPC χ.
Proof. The direction from right to left is Lemma 2.3. Suppose Φ 0IPC χ. By
a standard construction (see, e.g., [7]), we may extend Φ to a prime theory Φp ⊆
Fm0 of IPC such that Φp 0IPC χ. By a standard application of Zorn’s Lemma,
Φp is contained in a maximal theory Φmax ⊆ Fm0 of IPC. Then Φmax is also a
maximal theory of CPC. In fact, a Kripke model of Φmax is a singleton, i.e. a
classical truth-value assignment. Note that possibly χ ∈ Φmax. We now construct
a model of Φmax that identifies precisely those formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm0 which are
intuitionistically equivalent modulo prime theory Φp ⊆ Φmax. For this purpose,
we define the relation ≈ on Fm0 by
ϕ ≈ ψ :⇔ Φp ⊢IPC ϕ↔ ψ.
Notice that ≈ is defined on Fm0 ⊆ Fm and not on the whole set Fm. By IPC, ≈
is a congruence on Fm0, i.e. ≈ is an equivalence relation and ϕ1 ≈ ψ1, ϕ2 ≈ ψ2
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imply (ϕ1 ∗ ϕ2) ≈ (ψ1 ∗ ψ2) for ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}. Let ϕ denote the congruence
class of ϕ ∈ Fm0 modulo ≈. We define
M := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fm0}
TRUE := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φmax}
f⊥ := ⊥
f⊤ := ⊥ → ⊥
f∗(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ ∗ ψ for ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}
f(ϕ) :=
{
f⊤, if ϕ = f⊤
f⊥, else.
Since ≈ is a congruence on Fm0, these operations are well-defined. It is clear
that ϕ, ψ ∈ Φp implies Φp ⊢IPC ϕ ↔ ψ. It follows that f⊤ = Φp. Recall that
Heyting algebras can be axiomatized by equations that correspond to theorems
of IPC which are given in the form ϕ ↔ ψ. Then by construction, the above
defined operations form a Heyting algebra on M with ultrafilter TRUE and an
operation f. It remains to show that the truth conditions (i)–(iv) of Definition 3.3
are satisfied. Condition (iv) follows readily from the definition of f. Let us look
at condition (i), f(ϕ) ≤ ϕ, for any ϕ ∈ M , where ≤ is the underlying lattice
ordering. By definition, there are only two possibilities: f(ϕ) = f⊤ or f(ϕ) =
f⊥. In the latter case, there is nothing to show, since f⊥ is the bottom element of
the Heyting lattice. We assume the former case. Then, by definition of f, we
get ϕ = f⊤. Hence, condition (i) is satisfied. Now, we consider condition (ii),
f(f→(ϕ, ψ)) ≤ f→(f(f→(ψ, χ)), f(f→(ϕ, χ))). Again, if f(f→(ϕ, ψ)) =
f⊥, there is nothing to show. So we may assume f(f→(ϕ, ψ)) = f⊤, i.e. ϕ ≤ ψ.
Moreover, we may assume f(f→(ψ, χ)) = f⊤, since otherwise we are ready.
This implies ψ ≤ χ. Transitivity of ≤ yields ϕ ≤ χ, i.e. f(f→(ϕ, χ))) = f⊤.
It follows that f→(f(f→(ψ, χ)), f(f→(ϕ, χ))) = f⊤. Hence, condition (ii) is
verified. Finally, let us check condition (iii), f(f∨(ϕ, ψ)) ≤ f∨(f(ϕ), f(ψ)).
Suppose f(f∨(ϕ, ψ)) = f⊤. Then f∨(ϕ, ψ) = f⊤ = Φp. Thus, ϕ ∨ ψ = Φp
and therefore ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φp. Since Φp is a prime theory, ϕ ∈ Φp or ψ ∈ Φp. This
means that ϕ = f⊤ or ψ = f⊤. That is, f(ϕ) = f⊤ or f(ψ) = f⊤. In any case,
f∨(f(ϕ), f(ψ)) = f⊤, and condition (iii) is satisfied. We have shown thatM is
a model in the sense of Definition 3.3.
Now, we consider the assignment ε : V →M defined by x 7→ x. By induction,
ε(ϕ) = ϕ, for any formula ϕ ∈ Fm0. By construction, Φ ⊆ Φp and χ /∈ Φp.
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Furthermore, for every ϕ ∈ Fm0:
(M, ε)  ϕ⇔ ε(ϕ) = f(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ ϕ = f⊤ = Φp ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φp.
Hence, (M, ε)  Φ and (M, ε) 2 χ. Thus, Φ 1 χ. Soundness yields
Φ 0 χ. Q.E.D.
In Kripke semantics of IPC, truth means satisfaction at a given possible world.
The set of all formulas which are true at a given world form a prime theory of
IPC. Thus, intuitionistic truth of a formula ϕ means that ϕ belongs to a given
prime theory of IPC. The next two results show that the modal operator, restricted
to propositional formulas, is a predicate for intuitionistic truth. In this sense, the
modal operator of L can be viewed as a provability predicate.
Corollary 5.2 For any prime theory Φp ⊆ Fm0 of IPC there is an interpretation
(M, ε) such that for all ϕ ∈ Fm0:
(M, ε)  ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φp.
Proof. This follows immediately from the construction given in the proof of
Theorem 5.1. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5.3 For every interpretation (M, γ) there is a unique prime theory
Φp ⊆ Fm0 of IPC such that for all ϕ ∈ Fm0:
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ Φp.
That is, the modal operator , restricted to propositional formulas, can be seen
as a predicate for intuitionistic truth.
Proof. Let Φp := {ϕ ∈ Fm0 | γ(ϕ) = f⊤}. Then by truth conditions of a
model: (M, γ)  ϕ iff γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE iff f(γ(ϕ)) ∈ TRUE iff γ(ϕ) = f⊤
iff ϕ ∈ Φp, for any ϕ ∈ Fm0. We show by induction on a derivation that
Φp ⊢IPC ψ implies ψ ∈ Φp, for any ψ ∈ Fm0. If ψ is an intuitionistic ax-
iom, then it denotes the top element f⊤ of the Heyting algebra, i.e. γ(ψ) = f⊤
and ψ ∈ Φp. Finally, suppose ψ is obtained by Modus Ponens from formulas ϕ
and ϕ → ψ. By induction hypothesis, γ(ϕ) = f⊤ and γ(ϕ → ψ) = f⊤. The
latter means γ(ϕ) ≤ γ(ψ), where ≤ is the lattice ordering. Thus, γ(ψ) = f⊤
and ψ ∈ Φp. We have shown that Φp is deductively closed in IPC. Then follows
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that Φp is also consistent in IPC. Thus, Φp is an intuitionistic theory. Suppose
ϕ ∨ ψ ∈ Φp. Then γ(ϕ ∨ ψ) = f∨(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)) = f⊤. Since every model has the
disjunction property, γ(ϕ) = f⊤ or γ(ψ) = f⊤. That is, ϕ ∈ Φp or ψ ∈ Φp, and
Φp is a prime theory. It is clear that Φp is unique with the asserted property. Q.E.D.
It is known that the set of intuitionistic theorems is a prime theory. This fact is
called the disjunction property of intuitionistic logic (see, e.g., [7]). We conclude:
Corollary 5.4 There is an interpretation (MIPC, ε) such that for all proposi-
tional ϕ ∈ Fm0:
(MIPC, ε)  ϕ⇔ ⊢IPC ϕ.
By Lemma 2.2, ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ iff ⊢ (ϕ ↔ ψ). Then Corollary 5.4 (or, more
directly, the model construction given in the proof of Theorem 5.1) implies the
following.
Corollary 5.5 There is an interpretation (MIPC, ε) such that for all ϕ, ψ ∈
Fm0,
(MIPC, ε)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ ⊢IPC ϕ↔ ψ.
That is, model (MIPC, ε) identifies exactly those propositional formulas which
are intuitionistically equivalent. In general, however, a model satisfies more equa-
tions. In the two-element Boolean algebra, for example, the equations ϕ ≡ ¬¬ϕ
and ϕ ≡ ϕ are true. A result stronger than Corollary 5.5 would be the existence
of a model (M, γ) with the following property. For all ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm:
(M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ ⊢L ϕ ≡ ψ.
We call such an interpretation a canonical model. A canonical model satisfies only
those equations which are satisfied in all models. We have no proof for the exis-
tence of such a model for logic L and leave this question as an open problem. The
models of CPC can be regarded as two-element Boolean algebras. Thus, proposi-
tional identity ϕ ≡ ψ collapses with material equivalence ϕ ↔ ψ in CPC. Then
it is clear that a canonical model cannot exist. In IPC, propositional identity col-
lapses with intuitionistic equivalence. In fact, if we regard a proposition denoted
by ϕ as the set of possible worlds where ϕ is true and which are accessible from
the current world w (see, e.g., [15]), then ϕ↔ ψ is true at w iff at each accessible
world, both formulas are true or both formulas are not true. This is the same as
to say that (at the actual world w) ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition: ϕ ≡ ψ.
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A canonical model for IPC is the root of the Kripke frame consisting of all prime
theories as possible worlds and settheoretic inclusion as accessibility relation. The
root w0, i.e. the smallest prime theory, is the set of intuitionistic theorems. Then
ϕ↔ ψ is true at w0 iff ⊢IPC ϕ↔ ψ.
It is not hard to construct a canonical model for Suszko’s basic non-Fregean
logic SCI [2] such that ϕ ≡ ψ is satisfied iff ϕ = ψ (see [12]). Consequently,
⊢SCI ϕ ≡ ψ iff ϕ = ψ. In [13], a canonical model M for a non-Fregean logic
with propositional quantifiers is constructed such that for any two sentences ϕ and
ψ it holds thatM  ϕ ≡ ψ iff ϕ and ψ differ at most on bound variables.
References
[1] S. N. Artemov and L. Beklemishev, Provability logic. In: Handbook of
Philosophical Logic, D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, eds., vol. 13, 2nd ed.,
pp. 189 – 360. Springer, 2005.
[2] S. L. Bloom and R. Suszko, Investigation into the sentential calculus with
identity, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 13(3), 289 – 308, 1972.
[3] C. Caleiro and J. Ramos, From fibring to cryptofibring: A solution to the
collapsing problem, Logica Universalis, 1(1): 71 – 92, 2007.
[4] W. Carnielli and M. E. Coniglio, Combining Logics, The Stanford En-
cyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/logic-combining/
[5] W. Carnielli, C. Sernadas and J. Rasga Modulated fibring and the collapsing
problem, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 67(4): 1541 – 1569, 2002.
[6] L. F. del Cerro and A. Herzig, Combining classical and intuitionistic logic,
or: Intuitionistic implication as a conditional, in F. Baader and K. Schulz,
eds., Frontiers of Combining Systems: Proceedings of the 1st International
Workshop, Munich (Germany), volume 3 of Applied Logic Series, pp. 93 –
102, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
[7] D. van Dalen, Logic and Structure, 4th ed., Springer, 2004.
[8] D. Gabbay, Fibred semantics and the weaving of logics: Part 1, Journal of
Symbolic Logic, 61(4): 1057 – 1120, 1996.
16
[9] D. Gabbay, An overview of fibred semantics and the combination of logics, in
F. Baader and K. Schulz, eds., Frontiers of Combining Systems: Proceedings
of the 1st International Workshop, Munich (Germany), volume 3 of Applied
Logic Series, pp. 1 – 55, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
[10] D. Gabbay. Fibring logics. Oxford University Press, 1999.
[11] K. Go¨del, Eine Interpretation des intuitionistischen Aussagenkalku¨ls. Ergeb-
nisse eines Mathematischen Kolloquiums, 4:3940, 1933. English translation
in: S. Feferman et al., editors, Kurt Go¨del Collected Works, Vol. 1, pages
301303. Oxford University Press, Oxford, Clarendon Press, New York,
1986.
[12] S. Lewitzka, ∈I: An intuitionistic logic without Fregean Axiom and with
predicates for truth and falsity, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 50(3),
275 – 301, 2009.
[13] S. Lewitzka, Construction of a canonical model for a first-order non-
Fregean logic with a connective for reference and a total truth predicate,
Logic Journal of the IGPL, 20(6), 1083 – 1109, 2012.
[14] S. Lewitzka, Algebraic semantics for a modal logic close to S1, Journal of
Logic and Computation, published online 2014, doi:10.1093/logcom/exu067
[15] S. Lewitzka, Denotational Semantics for Modal Systems S3S5 Extended by
Axioms for Propositional Quantifiers and Identity, Studia Logica, 103(3),
507 – 544, 2015.
[16] J. C. C. McKinsey and A. Tarski, Some theorems about the sentential calculi
of Lewis and Heyting, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 13(1), 1 – 15, 1948.
[17] I. M. D’Ottaviano, H. A. Feitosa, On Go¨del’s modal interpretation of intu-
itionistic logic In: Jean-Yves Bziau, ed., Universal Logic: an anthology from
Paul Hertz to Dov Gabbay. 18 ed., v. XVII, pp. 71 – 88, Springer, 2012.
[18] A. Sernadas, C. Sernadas, J. Rasga and M. Coniglio, A graph-theoretic ac-
count of logics, Journal of Logic and Computation, 19(6), 1281 – 1320,
2009.
[19] A. Sernadas, C. Sernadas, J. Rasga and M. Coniglio, On graph-theoretic
Fibring of logics, Journal of Logic and Computation, 19(6), 1321 – 1357,
2009.
17
[20] A. Sernadas, C. Sernadas, and J. Rasga, On combined connectives, Logica
Universalis, 5(2), 205 – 224, 2011.
[21] A. Sernadas, C. Sernadas, and J. Rasga, On meet-combination of logics,
Journal of Logic and Computation 22(6), 1453 – 1470, 2012.
18
